i BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 53 



movement of which this &quot;whole &quot; is only the present 

 stage ! The truth is, that to represent this the entire 

 intellect would not be too much nay, it would not be 

 enough. It would be necessary to add to it what 

 we find in every other terminal point of evolution. 

 And these diverse and divergent elements must be 

 considered as so many extracts which are, or at least 

 which were, in their humblest form, mutually com 

 plementary. Only then might we have an inkling of 

 the real nature of the evolution movement ; and even 

 then we should fail to grasp it completely, for we 

 should still be dealing only with the evolved, which 

 is a result, and not with evolution itself, which is the 

 act by which the result is obtained. 



Such is the philosophy of life to which we are 

 leading up. It claims to transcend both mechanism 

 and finalism ; but, as we announced at the beginning, &quot; 

 it is nearer the second doctrine than the first. It will / r 

 not be amiss to dwell on this point, and show more { 

 precisely how far this philosophy of life resembles f 

 finalism and wherein it is different. 



Like radical finalism, although in a vaguer form, 

 our philosophy represents the organized world as a 

 harmonious whole. But this harmony is far from 

 being as perfect as it has been claimed to be. It admits 

 of much discord, because each species, each individual 

 even, retains only a certain impetus from the universal 

 vital impulsion and tends to use this energy in its own 

 interest. In this consists adaptation. The species and 

 the individual thus think only of themselves whence 

 arises a possible conflict with other forms of life. 

 Harmony, therefore, does not exist in fact ; it exists 

 rather in principle ; I mean that the original impetus 

 is a common impetus, and the higher we ascend the 



