ii INTELLIGENCE AND INSTINCT 157 



adopt then words sanctioned by usage, and give the 

 distinction between intelligence and instinct this more 

 precise formula : Intelligence, in so far as it is innate, is the 

 knowledge of a form ; instinct implies the knowledge of a 

 matter. 



From this second point of view, which is that of 

 knowledge instead of action, the force immanent in life 

 in general appears to us again as a limited principle, in 

 which originally two different and even divergent 

 modes of knowing coexisted and intermingled. The first 

 gets at definite objects immediately, in their materiality 

 itself. It says, &quot; This is what is.&quot; The second gets 

 at no object in particular ; it is only a natural power 

 of relating an object to an object, or a part to a part, or 

 an aspect to an aspect in short, of drawing conclusions 

 when in possession of the premisses, of proceeding from 

 what has been learnt to what is still unknown. It 

 does not say, &quot; This is &quot; ; it says only that &quot; if the 

 conditions are such, such will be the conditioned.&quot; 

 In short, the first kind of knowledge, the in 

 stinctive, would be formulated in what philosophers 

 call categorical propositions, while the second kind, 

 the intellectual, would always be expressed hypothetic- 

 ally. Of these two faculties, the former seems, at 

 first, much preferable to the other. And it would be 

 so, in truth, if it extended to an endless number of 

 objects. But, in fact, it applies only to one special 

 object, and indeed only to a restricted part of that object. 

 Of this, at least, its knowledge is intimate and full ; 

 not explicit, but implied in the accomplished action. 

 The intellectual faculty, on the contrary, possesses 

 naturally only an external and empty knowledge ; but 

 it has thereby the advantage of supplying a frame in 

 which an infinity of objects may find room in turn. It 



