,i THE FUNCTION OF THE INTELLECT 161 



human intellect, on the contrary, as relative to the needs 

 of action. Postulate action, and the very form of the 

 intellect can be deduced from it. This form is therefore 

 neither irreducible nor inexplicable. And, precisely 

 because it is not independent, knowledge cannot be said 

 to depend on it : knowledge ceases to be a product of 

 the intellect and becomes, in a certain sense, part and 

 parcel of reality. 



Philosophers will reply that action takes place in an 

 ordered world, that this order is itself thought, and 

 that we beg the question when we explain the intellect 

 by action, which presupposes it. They would be right 

 if our point of view in the present chapter was to be 

 our final one. We should then be dupes of an illusion 

 like that of Spencer, who believed that the intellect is 

 sufficiently explained as the impression left on us by 

 the general characters of matter : as if the order in 

 herent in matter were not intelligence itself! But we 

 reserve for the next chapter the question up to what 

 point and with what method philosophy can attempt 

 a real genesis of the intellect at the same time as of 

 matter. For the moment, the problem that engages 

 our attention is of a psychological order. We are 

 asking what is the portion of the material world to 

 which our intellect is specially adapted. To reply to 

 this question, there is no need to choose a system of 

 philosophy : it is enough to take up the point of view 

 of common sense. 



Let us start, then, from action, and lay down that 

 the intellect aims, first of all, at constructing. This 

 fabrication is exercised exclusively on inert matter, 

 in this sense, that even if it makes use of organized 

 material, it treats it as inert, without troubling about 

 the life which animated it. And of inert matter 



M 



