ii THE NATURE OF INSTINCT 183 



characters would be questioned by no one. As a 

 matter of fact, the hereditary transmission of a con 

 tracted habit is effected in an irregular and far from 

 precise manner, supposing it is ever really effected 

 at all. 



But the whole difficulty comes from our desire to 

 express the knowledge of the Hymenoptera in terms of 

 intelligence. It is this that compels us to compare the 

 Ammophila with the entomologist, who knows the 

 caterpillar as he knows everything else from the out 

 side, and without having on his part a special or vital 

 interest. The Ammophila, we imagine, must learn, 

 one by one, like the entomologist, the positions of 

 the nerve-centres of the caterpillar must acquire at 

 least the practical knowledge of these positions by 

 trying the effects of its sting. But there is no need 

 for such a view if we suppose a sympathy (in the 

 etymological sense of the word) between the Ammo 

 phila and its victim, which teaches it from within, so 

 to say, concerning the vulnerability of the caterpillar. 

 This feeling of vulnerability might owe nothing to 

 outward perception, but result from the mere presence 

 together of the Ammophila and the caterpillar, con 

 sidered no longer as two organisms, but as two 

 activities. It would express, in a concrete form, the 

 relation of the one to the other. Certainly, a scientific 

 theory cannot appeal to considerations of this kind. 

 It must not put action before organization, sympathy 

 before perception and knowledge. But, once more, 

 either philosophy has nothing to see here, or its r61e 

 begins where that of science ends. 



Whether it makes instinct a &quot; compound reflex,&quot; or 

 a habit formed intelligently that has become automatism, 

 or a sum of small accidental advantages accumulated 



