in THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 203 



the given. But action breaks the circle. If we had 

 never seen a man swim, we might say that swimming 

 is an impossible thing, inasmuch as, to learn to swim, 

 we must begin by holding ourselves up in the water and, 

 consequently, already know how to swim. Reasoning, in 

 fact, always nails us down to the solid grounHT_l3 uTTrT&quot;&quot; 

 quite simply, 1 throw myself into the water without 

 fear, I may keep myself up well enough at first by 

 merely struggling, and gradually adapt myself to the 

 new environment : I shall thus have learnt to swim. 

 So, in theory, there is a kind of absurdity in trying to 

 know otherwise than by intelligence; but if the r4sk-- 

 be frankly accepted, action win perhaps cut the &quot;&quot;knot&quot; &quot; 

 that reasoning has tied and will not unloose. 



Besides, the risk will appear to grow less, the more 

 our point of view is adopted. We have shown that 

 intellect has detached itself from a vastly wider reality, 

 but that there has never been a clean cut between 

 the two ; all around conceptual thought there remains 

 an indistinct fringe which recalls its origin. And further 

 we compared the intellect to a solid nucleus formed by 

 means of condensation. This nucleus does not differ 

 radically from the fluid surrounding it. It can only be 

 reabsorbed in it because it is made of the same 

 substance. He who throws himself into the water, 

 having known only the resistance of the solid earth, 

 will immediately be drowned if he does not struggle 

 against the fluidity of the new environment : he must 

 perforce still cling to that solidity, so to speak, 

 which even water presents. Only on this condition 

 can he get used to the fluid s fluidity. So of our 

 thought, when it has decided to make the leap. 



But leap it must, that is, leave its own environment. 

 Reason, reasoning on its powers, will never succeed in 



