in LAWS AND GENERA 239 



of the likeness between complex effects obtained by the 

 same composition of the same causes. But in the one 

 case as in the other, there is likeness, and consequently 

 possible generalization. And as that is all that interests 

 us in practice, since our daily life is and must be an 

 expectation of the same things and the same situations, 

 it is natural that this common character, essential from 

 the point of view of our action, should bring the two 

 orders together, in spite of a merely internal diversity 

 between them which interests speculation only. Hence 

 the idea of a general order of nature^ everywhere the 

 same, hovering over life and over matter alike. Hence 

 our habit of designating by the same word and represent 

 ing in the same way the existence of laws in the domain 

 of inert matter and that of genera in the domain of life. 

 Now, it will be found that this confusion is the 

 origin of most of the difficulties raised by the problem 

 of knowledge, among the ancients as well as among the 

 moderns. The generality of laws and that of genera 

 having been designated by the same word and subsumed 

 under the same idea, the geometrical order and the 

 vital order are accordingly confused together. Ac 

 cording to the point of view, the generality of laws is 

 explained by that of genera, or that of genera by that 

 of laws. The first view is characteristic of ancient 

 thought ; the second belongs to modern philosophy. 

 But in both ancient and modern philosophy the idea of 

 &quot; generality &quot; is an equivocal idea, uniting in its denota 

 tion and in its connotation incompatible objects and 

 elements. In both there are grouped under the same 

 concept two kinds of order which are alike only in the 

 facility they give to our action on things. We bring 

 together the two terms in virtue of a quite external 

 likeness, which justifies no doubt their designation by 



