in THE TWO KINDS OF ORDER 245 



which the Idea superadded itself, nor would modern 

 idealism have supposed a tc sensuous manifold &quot; that 

 the understanding organizes into nature. Now, it 

 is unquestionable that all order is contingent, and 

 conceived as such. But contingent in relation to what r 

 The reply, to our thinking, is not doubtful. An 

 order is contingent, and seems so, in relation to the 

 inverse order, as verse is contingent in relation to prose 

 and prose in relation to verse. But, just as all speech 

 which is not prose is verse and necessarily conceived 

 as verse, just as all speech which is not verse is prose 

 and necessarily conceived as prose, so any state of 

 things that is not one of the two orders is the other and 

 is necessarily conceived as the other. But it may happen 

 that we do not realize what we are actually thinking 

 of, and perceive the idea really present to our mind 

 only through a mist of affective states. Any one can 

 be convinced of this by considering the use we make of 

 the idea of disorder in daily life. When I enter a room 

 and pronounce it to be &quot; in disorder,&quot; what do I mean ? 

 The position of each object is explained by the 

 automatic movements of the person who has slept in the 

 room, or by the efficient causes, whatever they may be, 

 that have caused each article of furniture, clothing, etc., 

 to be where it is : the order, in the second sense of the 

 word, is perfect. But it is order of the first kind that 

 I am expecting, the order that a methodical person 

 consciously puts into his life, the willed order and not 

 the automatic : so I call the absence of this order 

 &quot;disorder.&quot; At bottom, all there is that is real, 

 perceived and even conceived, in this absence of one of 

 the two kinds of order, is the presence of the other. 

 But the second is indifferent to me, / am interested only 

 in the first, and 1 express the presence of the second 



