iv THE IDEA OF * NOTHING 299 



and the feeling^ experienced or imagined^ of a desire or a 

 regret. 



It follows from this double analysis that the idea of 

 the absolute nought, in the sense of the annihilation of 

 everything, is a self-destructive idea, a pseudo-idea, a 

 mere word. If suppressing a thing consists in replacing 

 it by another, if thinking the absence of one thing is 

 only possible by the more or less explicit representation 

 of the presence of some other thing, if, in short, anni 

 hilation signifies before anything else substitution, the 

 idea of an &quot; annihilation of everything &quot; is as absurd as 

 that of a square circle. The absurdity is not obvious, 

 because there exists no particular object that cannot be 

 supposed annihilated ; then, from the fact that there is 

 nothing to prevent each thing in turn being suppressed 

 in thought, we conclude that it is possible to suppose 

 them suppressed altogether. We do not see that 

 suppressing each thing in turn consists precisely in 

 replacing it in proportion and degree by another, and 

 therefore that the suppression of absolutely everything 

 implies a downright contradiction in terms, since the 

 operation consists in destroying the very condition 

 that makes the operation possible. 



But the illusion is tenacious. Though suppressing 

 one thing consists in fact in substituting another for it, 

 we do not conclude, we are unwilling to conclude, that 

 the annihilation of a thing in thought implies the sub 

 stitution in thought of a new thing for the old. We 

 agree that a thing is always replaced by another thing, 

 and even that our mind cannot think the disappearance 

 of an object, external or internal, without thinking 

 under an indeterminate and confused form, it is true 

 that another object is substituted for it. But we add 

 that the representation of a disappearance is that of a 



