iv THE IDEA OF * NOTHING 301 



point in clear light in his criticism of the ontological 

 argument. Then, what is it to think the object A 

 non-existent ? To represent it non-existent cannot 

 consist in withdrawing from the idea of the object 

 A the idea of the attribute u existence,&quot; since, I repeat, 

 the representation of the existence of the object is 

 inseparable from the representation of the object, 

 and indeed is one with it. To represent the object 

 A non-existent can only consist, therefore, in adding 

 something to the idea of this object : we add to it, in 

 fact, the idea of an exclusion of this particular object by 

 actual reality in general. To think the object A as 

 non-existent is first to think the object and con 

 sequently to think it existent ; it is then to think that 

 another reality, with which it is incompatible, supplants 

 it. Only, it is useless to represent this latter reality 

 explicitly ; we are not concerned with what it is ; it is 

 enough for us to know that it drives out the object A, 

 which alone is of interest to us. That is why we think 

 of the expulsion rather than of the cause which expels. 

 But this cause is none the less present to the mind ; it 

 is there in the implicit state, that which expels being 

 inseparable from the expulsion as the hand which drives 

 the pen is inseparable from the pen-stroke. The act by 

 which we declare an object unreal therefore posits the 

 existence of the real in general. In other words, to 

 represent an object as unreal cannot consist in depriving 

 it of every kind of existence, since the representation of 

 an object is necessarily that of the object existing. Such 

 an act consists simply in declaring that the existence 

 attached by our mind to the object, and inseparable from 

 its representation, is an existence wholly ideal that of 

 a mere possible. But the &quot;ideality&quot; of an object, and 

 the &quot; simple possibility &quot; of an object, have meaning 



