306 CREATIVE EVOLUTION 



has no other content than that of the affirmative 

 judgment which it judges. 



To be more precise, let us consider an existential, 

 instead of an attributive, judgment. If I say, &quot;The 

 object A does not exist,&quot; I mean by that, first, that we 

 might believe that the object A exists : how, indeed, can 

 we think of the object A without thinking it existing, 

 and, once again, what difference can there be between the 

 idea of the object A existing and the idea pure and simple 

 of the object A ? Therefore, merely by saying &quot;The 

 object A,&quot; I attribute to it some kind of existence, though 

 it be that of a mere possible, that is to say, of a pure 

 idea. And consequently, in the judgment &quot; The object 

 A is not,&quot; there is at first an affirmation such as &quot; The 

 object A has been,&quot; or &quot;The object A will be,&quot; or, 

 more generally, &quot; The object A exists at least as a 

 mere possible&quot; Now, when I add the two words &quot; is 

 not,&quot; I can only mean that if we go further, if we 

 erect the possible object into a real object, we shall be 

 mistaken, and that the possible of which I am speaking 

 is excluded from the actual reality as incompatible with 

 it. Judgments that posit the non-existence of a thing 

 are therefore judgments that formulate a contrast between 

 the possible and the actual (that is, between two kinds 

 of existence, one thought and the other found), where 

 a person, real or imaginary, wrongly believes that a 

 certain possible is realized. Instead of this possible, 

 there is a reality that differs from it and rejects it : the 

 negative judgment expresses this contrast, but it 

 expresses the contrast in an intentionally incomplete 

 form, because it is addressed to a person who is sup 

 posed to be interested exclusively in the possible that is 

 indicated, and is not concerned to know by what kind 

 of reality the possible is replaced. The expression of 



