iv THE IDEA OF NOTHING 307 



the substitution is therefore bound to be cut short. 

 Instead of affirming that a second term is substituted 

 for the first, the attention which was originally directed 

 to the first term will be kept fixed upon it, and upon it 

 alone. And, without going beyond the first, we shall 

 implicitly affirm that a second term replaces it in 

 saying that the first &quot;is not.&quot; We shall thus judge 

 a judgment instead of judging a thing. We shall 

 warn others or warn ourselves of a possible error instead 

 of supplying positive information. Suppress every 

 intention of this kind, give knowledge back its ex 

 clusively scientific or philosophical character, suppose 

 in other words that reality comes itself to inscribe itself 

 on a mind that cares only for things and is not interested 

 in persons : we shall affirm that such or such a thing 

 is, we shall never affirm that a thing is not. 



How comes it, then, that affirmation and negation 

 are so persistently put on the same level and endowed 

 with an equal objectivity ? How comes it that we have 

 so much difficulty in recognizing that negation is sub 

 jective, artificially cut short, relative to the human mind 

 and still more to the social life ? Xhe reason is, no 

 doubt, that both negation and affirmation are expressed 

 in propositions, and that any proposition, being formed 

 of words , which symbolize concepts, is something relative 

 to social life and to the human intellect. Whether 

 I say &quot; The ground is damp &quot; or &quot; The ground is 

 not damp,&quot; in both cases the terms &quot; ground &quot; and 

 &quot; damp &quot; are concepts more or less artificially created 

 by the mind of man, extracted, by his free initiative, 

 from the continuity of experience. In both cases the 

 concepts are represented by the same conventional 

 words. In both cases we can say indeed that the pro 

 position aims at a social and pedagogical end, since the 



