iv THE IDEA OF NOTHING 309 



dampness ; for the dry as well as the damp can give 

 impressions to sense, which will transmit them, as more 

 or less distinct ideas, to the intelligence. In this sense 

 the negation of dampness is as objective a thing, as 

 purely intellectual, as remote from every pedagogical 

 intention, as affirmation. But let us look at it more 

 closely : we shall see that the negative proposition, 

 &quot; The ground is not damp,&quot; and the affirmative 

 proposition, &quot; The ground is dry,&quot; have entirely 

 different contents. The second implies that we 

 know the dry, that we have experienced the specific 

 sensations, tactile or visual for example, that are at 

 the base of this idea. The first requires nothing of 

 the sort ; it could equally well have been formulated 

 by an intelligent fish, who had never perceived anything 

 but the wet. It would be necessary, it is true, that this 

 fish should have risen to the distinction between the 

 real and the possible, and that he should care to anticipate 

 the error of his fellow-fishes, who doubtless consider as 

 alone possible the condition of wetness in which they 

 actually live. Keep strictly to the terms of the pro 

 position, &quot; The ground is not damp,&quot; and you will find 

 that it means two things : (i) that one might believe 

 that the ground is damp, (2) that the dampness is re 

 placed in fact by a certain quality x. This quality is 

 left indeterminate, either because we have no positive 

 knowledge of it, or because it has no actual interest 

 for the person to whom the negation is addressed. 

 To deny, therefore, always consists in presenting in 

 an abridged form a system of two affirmations : the 

 one determinate, which applies to a certain possible ; 

 the other indeterminate, referring to the unknown or 

 indifferent reality that supplants this possibility. The 

 second affirmation is virtually contained in the judgment 



