iv THE IDEA OF &amp;lt; NOTHING* 311 



It will thus be shunted on to the siding of negation. 

 And especially it will be at the point of representing 

 a disappearance. But it will not yet have reached it. 

 To represent that a thing has disappeared, it is not 

 enough to perceive a contrast between the past and the 

 present ; it is necessary besides to turn our back on 

 the present, to dwell on the past, and to think the 

 contrast of the past with the present in terms of the 

 past only, without letting the present appear in it. 



The idea of annihilation is therefore not a pure idea ; 

 it implies that we regret the past or that we conceive 

 it as regrettable, that we have some reason to linger 

 over it. The idea arises when the phenomenon of sub 

 stitution is cut in two by a mind which considers only 

 the first half, because that alone interests it. Suppress 

 all interest, all feeling, and there is nothing left but the 

 reality that flows, together with the knowledge ever 

 renewed that it impresses on us of its present state. 



From annihilation to negation, which is a more 

 general operation, there is now only a step. All that 

 is necessary is to represent the contrast of what is, not 

 only with what has been, but also with all that might 

 have been. And we must express this contrast as 

 a function of what might have been, and not of what 

 is ; we must affirm the existence of the actual while 

 looking only at the possible. The formula we thus 

 obtain no longer expresses merely a disappointment 

 of the individual ; it is made to correct or guard 

 against an error, which is rather supposed to be the 

 error of another. In this sense, negation has a peda 

 gogical and social character. 



Now, once negation is formulated, it presents an 

 aspect symmetrical with that of affirmation ; if affirma 

 tion affirms an objective reality, it seems that negation 



