iv THE IDEA OF NOTHING 313 



there is only the image of all realities expelling one 

 another endlessly, in a circle ; in vain do we add that 

 the idea of non-existence is only that of the expulsion 

 of an imponderable existence, or a &quot; merely possible &quot; ex 

 istence, by a more substantial existence which would then 

 be the true reality ; in vain do we find in the sui generis 

 form of negation an element which is not intellectual, 

 negation being the judgment of a judgment, an 

 admonition given to some one else or to oneself, so 

 that it is absurd to attribute to negation the power of 

 creating ideas of a new kind, viz. ideas without content ; 

 in spite of all, the conviction persists that before 

 things, or at least under things, there is &quot; Nothing.&quot; 

 If we seek the reason of this fact, we shall find it 

 precisely in the feeling, in the social and, so to speak, 

 practical element, that gives its specific form to negation. 

 The greatest philosophic difficulties arise, as we have 

 said, from the fact that the forms of human action 

 venture outside of their proper sphere. We are made 

 in order to act as much as, and more than, in order 

 to think or rather, when we follow the bent of our 

 nature, it is in order to act that we think. It is there 

 fore no wonder that the habits of action give their tone 

 to those of thought, and that our mind always perceives 

 things in the same order in which we are accustomed 

 to picture them when we propose to act on them. 

 Now^it is unquestionable, as we remarked above, that 

 every human action has its starting-point in a dis 

 satisfaction, and thereby in a feeling of absence. We 

 should not act if we did not set before ourselves an 

 end, and we seek a thing only because we feel the 

 lack of it. Our action proceeds thus from &quot; nothing &quot; 

 to &quot; something,&quot; and its very essence is to embroider 

 &quot; something &quot; on the canvas of &quot; nothing.&quot; The truth 



