FORM AND BECOMING 323 



the apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate what 

 there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. 

 Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general. 

 Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or 

 even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set 

 going a kind of cinematograph inside us. We may 

 therefore sum up what we have been saying in the 

 conclusion that the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge 

 is of a cinematographic al kind. 



Of the altogether practical character of this operation 

 there is no possible doubt. Each of our acts aims at a 

 certain insertion of our will into the reality. There is, 

 between our body and other bodies, an arrangement 

 like that of the pieces of glass that compose a kaleido 

 scopic picture. Our activity goes from an arrange 

 ment to a rearrangement, each time no doubt giving 

 the kaleidoscope a new shake, but not interesting 

 itself in the shake, and seeing only the new 

 picture. Our knowledge of the operation of nature 

 must be exactly symmetrical, therefore, with the interest 

 we take in our own operation. In this sense we may 

 say, if we are not abusing this kind of illustration, 

 that the cinematographical character of our knowledge of 

 things is due to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation 

 to them. 



The cinematographical method is therefore the only 

 practical method, since it consists in making the general 

 character of knowledge form itself on that of action, 

 while expecting that the detail of each act should 

 depend in its turn on that of knowledge. In order 

 that action may always be enlightened, intelligence 

 must always be present in it ; but intelligence, in order 

 thus to accompany the progress of activity and ensure its 

 direction, must begin by adopting its rhythm. Action 



