iv MODERN SCIENCE 355 



view of a dynamic law which alone would give us 



Let us conclude, then, that our science is not only 

 distinguished from ancient science in this, that it seeks 

 laws, nor even in this, that its laws set forth relations 

 between magnitudes : we must add that the magnitude 

 to which we wish to be able to relate all others is time, 

 and that modern science must be defined pre-eminently by 

 its aspiration to take time as an independent variable. 

 But with what time has it to do ? 



We have said before, and we cannot repeat too often, 

 that the science of matter proceeds like ordinary know 

 ledge. It perfects this knowledge, increases its precision 

 and its scope, but it works in the same direction and 

 puts the same mechanism into play. If, therefore, 

 ordinary knowledge, by reason of the cinematographical 

 mechanism to which it is subjected, forbears to follow 

 becoming in so far as becoming is moving, the science of 

 matter renounces it equally. No doubt, it distinguishes 



1 J * O 



as great a number of moments as we wish in the interval 

 of time it considers. However small the intervals may 

 be at which it stops, it authorizes us to divide them again 

 if necessary. In contrast with ancient science, which 

 stopped at certain so-called essential moments, it is 

 occupied indifferently with any moment whatever. But 

 it always considers moments, always virtual stopping- 

 places, always, in short, immobilities._ Which amounts 

 to saying that real time, regarded as a flux, or, in other 

 words, as the very mobility of being, escapes the hold 

 of scientific knowledge. We have already tried to 

 establish this point in a former work. We alluded to 

 it again in the first chapter of this book. But it is 

 necessary to revert to it once more, in order to clear 

 up misunderstandings. 



