iv THE KANTIAN CRITICISM 379 



ledge would then appear as it is, limited, but not 

 relative. 



Such was the direction that Kantianism might have 

 pointed out to a revivified Cartesianism. But in this 

 direction Kant himself did not go. 



He would not, because, while assigning to knowledge 

 an extra-intellectual matter, he believed this matter to 

 be either co-extensive with intellect or less extensive 

 than intellect. Therefore he could not dream of cutting 

 out intellect in it, nor, consequently, of tracing the 

 genesis of the understanding and its categories. The 

 moulds of the understanding and the understanding itself 

 had to be accepted as they are, already made. Between 

 the matter presented to our intellect and this intellect 

 itself there was no relationship. The agreement between 

 the two was due to the fact that intellect imposed its 

 form on matter. So that not only was it necessary 

 to posit the intellectual form of knowledge as a kind 

 of absolute and give up the quest of its genesis, but 

 the very matter of this knowledge seemed too ground 

 down by the intellect for us to be able to hope to get it 

 back in its original purity. It was not the &quot; thing-in- 

 itself,&quot; it was only the refraction of it through our 

 atmosphere. 



If now we inquire why Kant did not believe that 

 the matter of our knowledge extends beyond its form, 

 this is what we find. The criticism of our knowledge 

 of nature that was instituted by Kant consisted in 

 ascertaining what our mind must be and what Nature 

 must be if the claims of our science are justified ; but 

 of these claims themselves Kant has not made the 

 criticism. I mean that he took for granted the idea of 

 a science that is one, capable of binding with the same 

 force all the parts of what is given, and of coordinating 



