iv THE KANTIAN CRITICISM 381 



itself that it will introduce us. So long as it was 

 regarded as the only material of our science, it reflected 

 back on all science something of the relativity which 

 strikes a scientific knowledge of spirit ; and thus the 

 perception of bodies, which is the beginning of the 

 science of bodies, seemed itself to be relative. Relative, 

 therefore, seemed to be sensuous intuition. But this is 

 not the case if distinctions are made between the different 

 sciences, and if the scientific knowledge of the spiritual 

 (and also, consequently, of the vital) be regarded as the 

 more or less artificial extension of a certain manner of 

 knowing which, applied to bodies, is not at all symbolical. 

 Let us go further : if there are thus two intuitions of 

 different order (the second being obtained by a reversal 

 of the direction of the first), and if it is toward the 

 second that the intellect naturally inclines, there is no 

 essential difference between the intellect and this in 

 tuition itself. The barriers between the matter of 

 sensible knowledge and its form are lowered, as also 

 between the &quot; pure forms &quot; of sensibility and the cate 

 gories of the understanding. The matter and form of 

 intellectual knowledge (restricted to its own object) are 

 seen to be engendering each other by a reciprocal 

 adaptation, intellect modelling itself on corporeity, and 

 corporeity on intellect. 



But this duality of intuition Kant neither would nor 

 could admit. It would have been necessary, in order 

 to admit it, to regard duration as the very stuff of 

 reality, and consequently to distinguish between the 

 substantial duration of things and time spread out in 

 space. It would have been necessary to regard space 

 itself, and the geometry which is immanent in space, as 

 an ideal limit in the direction of which material things 

 develop, but which they do not actually attain. Nothing 



