64 Darwinism and Other Essays. 



ways, the welfare of mankind. The science of 

 such a writer is very likely to be sound and valu 

 able, and what he tells us about woorara-poison 

 and frogs legs, and acute mania, will probably be 

 worthy of serious attention. But with his philos 

 ophy it is quite otherwise. When he has pro 

 ceeded as far in subjective analysis as he has in 

 the study of nerves, our materialist will find that 

 it was demonstrated, a century ago, that the group 

 of phenomena constituting the table has no real 

 existence whatever in a philosophical sense. For 

 by &quot; reality &quot; in philosophy is meant &quot; persistence 

 irrespective of particular conditions,&quot; and the 

 group of phenomena constituting a table persists 

 only in so far as it is held together in cognition. 

 Take away the cognizing mind, and the colour, 

 form, position, and hardness of the table all the 

 attributes, in short, that characterize it as matter 

 at once disappear. That something remains 

 we may grant, but this something is unknown and 

 unknowable : it is certainly not the group of phe 

 nomena constituting the table. Apart from con 

 sciousness there are no such things as colour, form, 

 position, or hardness, and there is no such thing 

 as matter. This great truth, established by 

 Berkeley, is the very foundation of modern scien 

 tific philosophy ; and, though it has been misap- 



