68 Danvinism and Other Essays. 



ages we should not have seen the phenomena of 

 consciousness manifested in connection with a 

 fragment of porphyry, or a handful of sand, or a 

 tree-fern, any more than we see such things to^ 

 day, but only in connection with animals endowed 

 with nerves. In thus extending the results of 

 present experience to the past, the element of 

 sequence in time is introduced in such a way as 

 to suggest the causation of consciousness by nerve- 

 matter. Nevertheless, the assertion of the evolu 

 tionist is purely historical in its import, and in 

 cludes no hypothesis whatever as to the ultimate 

 origin of consciousness; least of all is it intended 

 to imply that consciousness was evolved from mat 

 ter. It is not only inconceivable how mind should 

 have been produced from matter, but it is incon 

 ceivable that it should have been produced from 

 matter, unless matter possessed already the attri 

 butes of mind in embryo, an alternative which 

 it is difficult to invest with any real meaning. The 

 problem is altogether too abstruse to be solved 

 with our present resources. But it is curious to 

 hear honest theologians gravely urging against 

 Mr. Spencer that you cannot obtain mind from 

 the &quot; primordial fire-mist &quot; unless the germs of 

 mind were somehow present already. I hope I 

 am not accrediting Mr. Spencer with any opinion 



