170 Darwinism and Other Essays. 



about it. As we know less about moral science 

 than about any other, our opinions, even about 

 those &quot; moral truths &quot; which are universally ad 

 mitted, are more liable to change than our opin 

 ions about similarly received truths in other mat 

 ters. Mr. Buckle could have, therefore, no ground 

 for asserting that the interpretation put upon 

 &quot;moral truths&quot; is unchanging as compared with 

 that put upon &quot; intellectual truths.&quot; 



Our author says, somewhat inconsistently, that 

 &quot; moral truths &quot; receive no additions, and again 

 that they receive fewer additions than &quot; intellec 

 tual truths.&quot; We shall speedily show that the 

 first of these statements is at variance with fact, 

 and that the second has no logical value, and will 

 not help his argument in the least. 



It is not true that &quot; moral truths &quot; have re 

 ceived no additions. It is not true, as Mr. Buckle 

 says, that &quot; the sole essentials of morals have 

 been known for thousands of years, and not one 

 jot or tittle has been added to them by all the 

 sermons, homilies, and text-books which moralists 

 have been able to produce.&quot; It is not true, as 

 Sir James Mackintosh says, that &quot; morality ad 

 mits of no discoveries.&quot; It is not true, as Con- 

 dorcet says, that &quot; la morale de toutes les nations 

 a ete la meme&quot; It is not true, as Kant says, that 



