Mr. Buckle s Fallacies. 175 



both should be spoken of together as truths or 

 judgments in distinction from feelings. Mr. 

 Buckle s argument, then, when laid bare, is as 

 follows : that some truths are constant, while 

 others are not, which is false ; and that one set 

 of truths receives additions, while another does 

 not, which is also false. 



But this is not all. Our author s argument is 

 not only untenable, but it is irrelevant to the sub 

 ject in debate. Even if he could establish his 

 point, he would be none the more forward. 

 Startling as this assertion may seem, it is never 

 theless indisputable. For if his reasoning hith 

 erto were valid, it would prove merely this 

 that our knowledge of some subjects advances, 

 while our knowledge of others does not. But Mr. 

 Buckle s professed object is to show that feeling 

 as compared with knowledge is of no account as a 

 civilizing force. To what end, then, does he go 

 so far out of his way in giving us this jumble of 

 ill-digested argument to show the &quot; superiority &quot; 

 of some intellectual acquisitions over others ? This 

 singular aberration results from his confounding 

 truth with feeling, the intellectual with the emo 

 tional part of our nature. He seems to forget the 

 distinction between knowing in what duty con 

 sists and having the intention to perform it. But 



