176 Darwinism and Other Essays. 



it is altogether one thing to wish to do right, and 

 another thing to know what it is right to do, as 

 many a luckless wight finds out to his cost. Far 

 ther on Mr. Buckle recognizes the distinction 

 clearly enough. 



It would, however, be rather unfortunate than 

 otherwise for Mr. Buckle s main argument if he 

 could succeed in showing that &quot; the sole essentials 

 of morality have been known for thousands of 

 years.&quot; For if it were true that men knew what 

 was right that they were acquainted with all 

 the laws to which our conduct ought to conform 

 in ancient times as well as at the present day, 

 and that they have nevertheless advanced in the 

 practice of morality, we should be obliged to con 

 clude that, as the knowledge has remained station 

 ary, it must have been the development of moral 

 feeling and the increase of good intentions alone 

 which could have occasioned the progress. The 

 contrast is really between moral truths and moral 

 feelings. So that, if Mr. Buckle had succeeded in 

 proving that &quot; moral knowledge &quot; does not ad 

 vance, and should at the same time succeed in his 

 attempt to prove that &quot; moral feeling &quot; does not 

 improve, he would, if consistent, arrive at the 

 singular result that there has been no improve 

 ment at all in the actions of men. 



