DISCOURSE ON METHOD. 27 



probable ; and even although we should not remark 

 a greater probability in one opinion than in 

 another, we ought notwithstanding to choose one or 

 the other, and afterwards consider it, in so far as it y 

 relates to practice, as no longer dubious, but mani- 

 festly true and certain, since the reason by which 

 our choice has been determined is itself possessed of 

 these qualities. This principle was sufficient thence- 

 forward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs 

 of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of 

 such feeble and uncertain minds as, destitute of any 

 clear and determinate principle of choice, allow 

 themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the 

 best, which they abandon the next, as the opposite. 

 My third maxim was to endeavour always to con- 

 quer myself rather than fortune, and change my ^ 

 desires rather than the order of the world, and in ** 

 general, accustom myself to the persuasion that, J 

 except our -own thoughts, there is nothrnj^ajaaolutolg / |l 

 iiy our power : so that when we have done our best 

 in respect" of things external to us, all wherein we 

 fail of success is to be held, as regards us, abso- 

 lutely impossible: and this single principle seemed 

 to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the 

 future anything which I could not obtain, and thus 

 render me contented; for since our will naturally 

 seeks those objects alone which the understanding 

 represents as in some way possible of attainment, it 

 is plain, that if we consider all external goods as 

 equally beyond our power, we shall no more regret 

 the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth, 

 when deprived of them without any fault of ours, 



