42 DESCARTES. 



falsity is contained, this can only be the case with 

 such as are to some extent confused and obscure, 

 and in this proceed from nothing, (participate of 

 negation,) that is, exist in us thus confused because 

 we are not wholly perfect. ' And it is evident that it 

 is not less repugnant that falsity or imperfection, in 

 so far as it is imperfection, should proceed from 

 God, than that truth or perfection should proceed 

 from nothing. But if we did not know that all 

 which we possess of real and true proceeds from a 

 Perfect and Infinite Being, however clear and dis- 

 tinct our ideas might be, we should have no ground 

 on that account for the assurance that they pos- 

 sessed the perfection of being truy 1 



But after the knowledge of God and of the soul 

 has rendered us certain of this rule, we can easily 

 understand that the truth of the thoughts we experi- 

 ence when awake, ought not in the slightest degree 

 to be called in question on account of the illusions 

 of our dreams. For if it happened that an indi- 

 vidual, even when asleep, had some very distinct 

 idea, as, for example, if a geometer should discover 

 some new demonstration, the circumstance of his 

 being asleep would not militate against its truth; 

 and as for the most ordinary error of our dreams, 

 which consists in their representing various -ob- 

 jects in the same way as our external senses, 

 this is not prejudicial, since it leads us very prop- 

 erly to suspect the truth of the ideas of sense; 

 for we are not unfrequently deceived in the same 

 manner when awake; as when persons in the 

 jaundice see all objects yellow, or when the stars or 



