DISCOURSE ON METHOD. 6l 



although such machines might execute many things 

 with equal or perhaps greater perfection than any 

 of us, they would, without doubt, fail in certain 

 others from which it could be discovered that they 

 did not act from knowledge, but solely from the 

 disposition of their organs : for while Reason is an 

 universal instrument that is alike available on every 

 occasion, these organs, on the contrary, need a par- 

 ticular arrangement for each particular action; 

 whence it must be morally impossible that there 

 should exist in any machine a diversity of organs 

 sufficient to enable it to act in all the occurrences of 

 life, in the way in which our reason enables us to 

 act. Again, by means of these two tests we may 

 likewise know the difference between men and 

 brutes. For it is highly deserving of remark, that 

 there are no men so dull and stupid, not even idiots, 

 as to be incapable of joining together different 

 words, and thereby constructing a declaration by 

 which to make their thoughts understood; and that 

 on the other hand, there is no other animal, however 

 perfect or happily circumstanced, which can do the 

 like. Nor does this inability arise from want of 

 organs: for we observe that magpies and parrots 

 can utter words like ourselves, and are yet unable to 

 speak as we do, that is, so as to show that they 

 understand what they say; in place of which men 

 born deaf and dumb, and thus not less, but rather 

 more than the brutes, destitute of the organs which 

 others use in speaking, are in the habit of spon- 

 taneously inventing certain signs by which they dis- 

 cover their thoughts to those who, being usually in 



