16 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS. 



which we infer to be prompted by, or associated with, mental 

 antecedents or accompaniments analogous to those of which 

 we are directly conscious in our own subjective experience. 

 That is to say, starting from what I know subjectively of the 

 operations of my own individual mind, and of the activi- 

 ties which in my own organism these operations seem to 

 prompt, I proceed by analogy to infer from the observable 

 activities displayed by other organisms, the fact that certain 

 mental operations underlie or accompany these activities. 



From this statement of the case it will be apparent that 

 our knowledge of mental activities in any organism other 

 than our own is neither subjective nor objective. That it is 

 not subjective I need not wait to show. That it is not 

 objective may be rendered obvious by a few moments' reflec- 

 tion. For it is evident that mental activities in other 

 organisms can never be to us objects of direct knowledge ; as 

 I have just said, we can only infer their existence from the 

 objective sources supplied by observable activities of such 

 organisms. Therefore all our knowledge of mental activities 

 other than our own really consists of an inferential inter- 

 pretation of bodily activities — this interpretation being 

 founded on our subjective knowledge of our own mental 

 activities. By inference we project, as it were, the known 

 patterns of our own mental chromograph on what is to us 

 the otherwise blank screen of another mind ; and our only 

 knowledge of the processes there taking place is really due 

 to such a projection of our own subjectively. This matter 

 has been well and clearly presented by the late Professor 

 Clifford, who has coined the exceedingly appropriate term 

 eject (in contradistinction to subject and object), whereby to 

 designate the distinctive character of a mind (or mental pro- 

 cess) other than our own in its relation to our own. I shall 

 therefore adopt this convenient term, and speak of all our 

 possible knowledge of other minds as ejective. 



Now in this necessarily ejective method of enquiry, what 

 is the kind of activities that we are entitled to regard as 

 indicative of Mind ? I certainly do not so regard the flowing 

 of a river or the blowing of a wind. Why ? First, because 

 the subjects are too remote in kind from my own organism to 

 admit of my drawing any reasonable analogy between them 

 and it ; and, secondly, because the activities which they 

 present are invariably of the same kind under the same cir- 



