THE ROOT-PRIXCIPLES OF MIND. 



CHAPTER IV. 



The Eoot-principles of Mind. 



Although tlie phenomena of Mind, and so of Choice, are 

 both complex, and as to their causation obscure, I think we 

 liave now seen that we are justified in behevino- that they all 

 present a physical basis. That is to say, whatever opinion 

 we may happen to entertain regarding the ultimate nature of 

 these phenomena, in view of the known facts of physiology, 

 we ought all to be agreed concerning the doctrine that the 

 mental processes wdiicli w^e cognize as subjective, are the 

 psychical equivalents of neural processes which we recog- 

 nize as objective. As already stated, I have elsewhere con- 

 sidered the various hypotheses concerning the nature and the 

 various attempts at an explanation of this equivalency 

 between mental processes and neural processes ; but here I 

 desire to consider the fact of this equivalency merely as a 

 fact. It will therefore signify nothing to my discussion 

 whether, with the materialists, we rest in this fact as final, or 

 endeavour, with men of other schools, to seek an explanation 

 of the fact of some more ultimate character. It is enough 

 if w^e are agreed that every psychical change of which we 

 have any experience is invariably associated with a definite 

 physical change, wdiatever w^e may suppose to be the nature 

 and significance of this association. 



Looking, then, at the phenomena of Mind as invariably 

 presenting a physical, or, as we may indiiferently call it, a 

 physiological side, I shall endeavour to point out wdiat I con- 

 ceive to be the most ultimate principle of physiology which 

 analysis show^s to be common to them all. On the mental 

 side, as w^e have already seen, we have no difficulty in dis- 

 tinguishing this ultimate principle, or common characteristic, 

 as that which we designate by the terra Choice. Now if the 

 power of choice is the distinctive peculiarity of a mental 



