CONSCIOUSNESS. 71 



in the order of their probable evohition, it may often appear 

 chat I am, as it were, going back upon, or in part repeating, 

 what I have already said. But this apparent defect in the 

 method of my exposition will, I think, be seen on closer 

 attention to be more than compensated for by the advantage 

 of avoiding confusion between physiology and psychology. 

 It would, for instance, liave been easy to have split up the 

 chapter on the Physical Basis of ]Mind already alluded to, 

 and to have apportioned its various parts to those among the 

 succeeding chapters which treat of the psychological aspects 

 of the physiological principles set forth in those various 

 parts ; but the result would have been largely to have 

 obscured the doctrine which I desired to make plain througli- 

 out — viz., that all mental processes must be regarded as pre-\U 

 senting physical counterparts.* 1\» 



So much in explanation of my method being understood, 

 I shall begin the psychology of mental evolution by con- 

 sidering that in which the mind-element must be regarded as 

 consisting — namely. Consciousness. Turning to the diagram, 

 it will be observed that I have written the word " Con- 

 sciousness " in a perpendicular direction, beginning at level 14 

 and extending to level 19. My reason for doing tliis is 

 because the rise of Consciousness is probably so gradual, and' 

 certainly so undefined to observation, that any attempt to 

 draw the line at which it does arise would be impossible, 

 even on the rough and general scale wherewith I have endea- 

 voured to draw the lines at which the sundry mental faculties 

 may be regarded as taking origin. Therefore I have repre- 

 sented the rise of Consciousness as occupying a considerable 

 area in our representative map, instead of a definite line. 

 This area I make to begin with the first development of 

 " Xervous Adjustments," and to terminate with the earliest 

 appearance of the power of associating ideas. 



In now proceeding to justify this assignment of limits 

 between the earliest dawn of Consciousness and the place 

 where Consciousness may first be regarded as truly such, I 

 may best begin by saying that I shall not attempt to define 



* It seems almost needless to add that the impossibility of entirely sepa- 

 rating psycliology from pliysiology for the purposes of exposition will, mutafist 

 ynufandis, continue to meet us more or less throughout the following, as it 

 has throughout the preceding chapters ; but I shall endeavour always to 

 make it clear when I am speaking of mental processes and when of physical. 



