130 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS. 



shines, and in all the habitual phenomena of experience such 

 memories as this become so blended with our perceptions of 

 tlie phenomena that the memories may be said to form 

 integral parts of the perceptions. Suppose, for instance, we 

 see a man whose face we know, but cannot remember who 

 the man is. Here the perception that the object which we 

 see is a man, and not any other of the innumerable objects in 

 Nature, is so intimately bound up with a well organized 

 association of ideas, that we do not think of the perception 

 thus far as really depending on memory. It is only when we 

 turn to the incompletely organized association of ideas 

 between the particular face and the particular individual, 

 that we recognize the incompleteness of this part of the 

 perception to depend upon the incompleteness of memory. 



Now these considerations, obvious though they appear, 

 constitute the first stage in a disagreement on an important 

 matter of principle, which will become more pronounced when 

 I have to deal with the liigher faculties of mind, and which, I 

 regret to say, has reference to the writings of Mr. Spencer. In 

 his chapter on Memory Mr. Spencer takes the view that, so long 

 as " psychical changes are completely automatic, memory, as 

 we understand it, cannot exist — there cannot exist these 

 irregular psychical changes seen in the association of ideas." 

 Now, I have already given my reasons for not restricting the 

 term Memory to the association of ideas ; but, passing over 

 this point, I cannot agree that if psychical changes (as dis- 

 ' tinguished from physiological changesj are completely auto- 

 matic, they are on this account precluded from being regai'ded 

 as mnemonic. Because I have so often seen the sun shine, 

 that my memory of it, as shining, has become automatic, I 

 see no reason why my memory of this fact, simply on account 

 of its perfection, should be called no-memory. And similarly 

 with all those well-organized memories which constitute 

 integral parts of perceptions. In so far as they involve true 

 " psychological changes," and therefore imply the presence of 

 conscious recognition as distinguished from reflex action, so far, 

 I think, no line of demarcation should be drawn between 

 them and any less perfect memories. I shall recur to this 

 point when I come to consider Mr. Spencer's views on 

 Instinct and Eeason. 



Another point which we have here to consider is the part 

 which heredity has played in forming the perceptive faculty 



