IXSTIXCT. 159 



CHAPTER XI. 



Instinct. 



Definition. 



I SHALL begin this important and extensive part of my 

 subject by repeating the definition of Instinct which I laid 

 down in my former work. It will be remembered that for 

 the sake of precision 1 there limited the term Instinct as 

 follows : — 



" Instinct is reflex action into which there is imported 

 the element of consciousness. The term is therefore a 

 generic one, comprising all those faculties of mind which are 

 concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to in- 

 dividual experience, without necessary knowledge of the 

 relation between means employed and ends attained, but 

 similarly performed under similar and frequently recurring 

 circumstances by all the individuals of the same species." 



Eef erring the reader to the context for my justification of 

 this definition,* I shall here only further make this general 

 statement. It follows from the above definition of Instinct, 

 that a stimulus which evokes a reflex action is, at most, a 

 sensation ;t but a stimulus which evokes an instinctive 

 action is a perception. After what I have already said in 

 Chapter IX concerning the distinction between a sensation 

 and a perception, my meaning now will be clearly under- 

 stood. For if a perception differs from a sensation in that it 

 presents a mental element, and if an instinctive action differs 

 from a reflex action in that it presents a mental element, it 

 is easy to see that a stimulus supplied by a sensation is to 

 a reflex action what a stimulus supplied by a perception is to 

 an instinctive action ; because if a sensation could act as a 



* Animal Intelligence, pp. 10-] 7. 



f I say "at most," because sueli a stimulus may be less than a sensation, 

 in that it may never cross the field of consciousness. 



