EXAMINATION OF THE THEORIES OF OTHER WRITERS. 257 



rudimentary consciousness," nevertheless this consciousness 

 is not essential to the formation of the instinct ; but, on the 

 contrary, is an effect of the growing complexity of the in- 

 stinct — "the quick succession of changes in a ganglion, 

 implying as it does perpetual experiences of differences and 

 likenesses, constitutes the raw material of consciousness; 

 the implication is that as fast as instinct is developed, some 

 kind of consciousness becomes nascent." 



Now, although we have seen in a previous chapter that 

 this view contains much truth — and truth that is of special 

 value in relation to the development of Consciousness — it 

 appears to me impossible to obtain by it a complete explana- 

 tion of the phenomena of instinct. Multitudes of facts of 

 the kind which I have given may be rendered to prove that 

 many of the higher instincts can only have arisen by way of 

 " lapsed intelligence ;" so that if I were called upon to adopt 

 either the extreme view of Spencer, which abolishes intelli- 

 gence and even consciousness as a factor in the formation of 

 instinct, or the extreme antithetical view of Lewes, which 

 ignores reflex action with natural selection as other factors in 

 the process ; I should feel less difficulty in choosing the latter 

 than the former. Not only do many of the higher instincts 

 bear internal evidence of having been at some period of their 

 history determined by intelligence, and not only do many of 

 these higher instincts now show themselves to be plastic 

 under an admixture with " a little dose of judgment," but the 

 examples of instinct which are chosen by Mr. Spencer are 

 not, strictly speaking, examples of instinct at all. They are 

 chosen as illustrations because they are the simplest cases of 

 what is ordinarily called instinct, and so lie nearest to reflex 

 action ; if, however, we pause to examine any of them, we 

 find that they are not true instincts, but cases of more or less 

 elaborate neuro-muscular adjustment, or, in his own words, 

 of " compound reflex action." And the fact that he defines 

 or " describes " instinct as compound reflex action does not 

 carry any proof that his doctrine is correct. To call a spade 

 a club, and then argue that because it is a club it cannot be a 

 spade, is futile ; the question consists in the validity of the 

 definition. Now it is just because we cannot draw a line 

 between simple reflex action and " compound reflex action," 

 so as to say that the one is mechanical and the other instinc- 

 tive, that I have drawn the line at consciousness, and 



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