EXAMINATION OF THE THEORIES OF OTHER WRITERS. 261 



even as regards the instincts of wild animals the judgment in 

 question appears to me no less objectionable. How, for 

 instance, are we to account by any process of " direct equili- 

 bration " for the incubating instinct, cell-making instinct, the 

 instinct of cocoon-spinning, not to mention all the other 

 primary instincts which I have considered, nor again to repeat 

 all the proof of the variability and heredity of acquired 

 habits ? 



Still, having thus shown as clearly as I can that in my 

 opinion Mr. Spencer certainly attributes much too little to 

 the influence of natural selection in the formation of instincts, 

 and also that I think he has committed a still graver over- 

 sight by altogether ignoring the influence of lapsing intelli- 

 gence, I shall next show that his argument is of use in dis- 

 covering another consideration which, for the sake of avoiding 

 confusion, I have hitherto suppressed. His argument briefly 

 stated is that instincts may arise independently both of 

 natural selection and of lapsing intelUgence, by " direct 

 equilibration " alone ; he supposes them to arise immediately 

 out of reflex action. ISTow, although we have seen that if 

 such is the case they ought not to be called instincts, unless 

 they present a mental constituent, still they must be called 

 instincts if, as he further supposes, the growing complexity of 

 the reflex process culminates in evolving such an element. 

 We have already seen, while treating of the dawn of con- 

 sciousness, that this most probably is the way in which the 

 mind-element arose, and, if so, Mr. Spencer's argument does 

 present a possible third mode in which many of the simpler 

 instincts — or instincts of the lowest animals — may have 

 taken origin. This third mode, it will be observed, is the 

 converse or opposite of that which we have called the 

 lapsing of intelligence ; it is a mode which leads up to or 

 culminates in consciousness (when for the first time the action 

 ceases to be reflex and becomes instinctive), instead of de- 

 scending or becoming degraded into unconsciousness. Now, 

 that such a process may take place, is, I think, on a priori 

 grounds very probable, although from the nature of the case 

 it is not possib]e to find proof of its occurrence / for if it does 

 occur, it can only do so among the lowest animals, where we 

 are not able to obtain evidence of consciousness even if in- 

 cipiently present. ' Therefore, as the process can only refer to 

 the genesis of actions which occupy the doubtful border-land 



