REASON. 331 



to make the important addition that it must be strictly 

 limited to the objective aspect, as distinguished both from the 

 subjective and ejective aspects of the phenomena. In other 

 words, if we have regard only to the physical aspect of the 

 phenomena (i.e., the physiology of ganglionic processes as 

 expressed in the adjustive movements of organisms), this 

 statement of the case is imexceptionable. But if we passi 

 from physiology to psychology, the statement ceases -to be t 

 adequate ; for both in the region of subjective and of ejective | 

 psychology it would fail to express the important distinction [ 

 between two very different acts of mind — viz., one in which 

 there is no knowledge of the relation between means em- 

 ployed and ends attained, and one in which there is such 

 knowledge.* 



But, passing over this point, we arrive at a lucid state- 

 ment of the view that " when the correspondence has advanced 

 to those environing objects and acts which present groups of 

 attributes and relations of considerable complexity, and which 

 occur with comparative infrequency — when, consequently, the 

 repetition of experiences has been insufticient to make the 

 sensory changes produced by such groups cohere perfectly 

 with the adaptive motor changes — when such motor changes 

 and the impressions that accompany them simply become 

 nascent : then, by implication, there result ideas of such 

 motor changes and impressions, or, as already explained, 

 memories of the motor changes before performed under like 

 circumstances, and of the concomitant impressions." Still 

 there is not yet any manifestation of rationality. But now, 

 " when the confusion of a complex impression with some 

 allied one causes a confusion among the nascent motor exci- 

 tations, there is entailed a certain hesitation, and .... 

 ultimately some one set of motor excitations will prevail over 

 the rest." The strongest set will eventually pass into action, 

 and as this set will usually have reference to the circumstances 

 which have recurred most frequently in experience, " the 

 action will, on the average of cases, be the one best adapted 

 to the circumstances. But an action thus produced is nothing 



* It -will be observed that if we adopt Mr. Spencer's definition of Instinct, 

 tlie breacli on the mental side is still further widened — the distinction 

 between Instinct and Eeason being then equivalent to the distinction between 

 nervous actions having no mental counterparts at all, and nervous actions 

 which on their subjective side are intentionally adaptive. 



