REASON. 333 



more, and there may not he even so much ganglionic dis- 

 turbance or consequent delay of response, as there may be 

 where no act of rationality is concerned — as, e.g., in a conflict 

 of instincts. 



Turning now to my second point of difference witli 

 Mr. Spencer, I can see no adequate ground for concluding 

 with him that Eeason can only arise out of Instinct. On the 

 contrary, holding, as T have explained, that Eeason has its 

 antecedents in the habitual inferences of sensuous perception, 

 that Instinct (as distinguished from Eeflex Action) likewise 

 has its antecedents in sensuous perception, and that neither 

 Eeason nor Instinct can advance beyond this first origin 

 without an always corresponding advance in the powers of 

 perception ; holding these views, I am forced to conclude that ^ 

 Perception is the common stem out of which Instinct and i 

 Eeason arise as independent branches. In so far as Percep- 

 tion involves Inference, Instinct involves Perception, and 

 Eeason involves Inference, there arises, of course, a genetic 

 connection between Instinct and Eeason ; but this connection 

 is clearly not of the kind which Mr. Spencer indicates : it is 

 organic, and not historic. 



This important divergence in my views from those of 

 Mr. Spencer I take to be due to his manner of regarding the 

 relations that subsist between nervous changes which are 

 accompanied by Consciousness, and nervous changes which 

 are not so accompanied. Thus the divergence between our 

 views on this matter began so far back as in our respective 

 analyses of Memory, where I observed, '' I cannot agree that if 

 'psychical changes (as distinguished from physiological changes) 

 are completely automatic, they are on this account to be 



precluded from being regarded as mnemonic In 



so far as they involve the presence of conscious recognition, as 

 distinguished from reflex action, so far, I think, no line of 

 demarcation should be drawn between them and any less 

 perfect memories."* Again, the divergence was manifested 

 when I came to treat of Perception, and I there gave my 

 reasons for regarding it as " very questionable whether the only 

 factors which lead to the differentiating of psychical processes 

 from reflex nervous processes are (as Mr. Spencer alleges) 

 complexity of operation combined with infrequency of occur- 

 rence, "f And the divergence in question became still more 

 * See p. 130. t See p. liO. 



