FEDERAL TRESPASS STATUTES 125 



other lands reserved or purchased for the use of the United 

 States. 



An act of June 4, 1897, (30 Stat. 11) which constitutes the 

 fundamental law for the administration of the National 

 Forests provided that any violation of the act or of the ad- 

 ministrative regulations which should be made in compli- 

 ance therewith should be punished under section 5388 of the 

 Revised Statutes as amended by the act of June 4, 1S88 

 (25 Stat, 166). 



None of the Federal acts contains the words "knowingly," 

 "wilfully" or "maliciously." as applicable to the cutting- and 

 removal of timber from public lands. The word "know- 

 ingly" was used in the act of March 2, 1831, section 2461 of 

 the Revised Statutes, the act of June 3, 1878, (20 Stat. 89) 

 and in section 49 of the act of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1098) 

 in the provisions imposing penalties for the transportation, 

 on vessels or railroads, of timber unlawfully cut from public 

 lands; and the word "wantonly" was used in the act of 1831, 

 the act of March 3, 1S59 (11 Stat. 408) sections 2461 and 

 5388 of the Revised Statutes, sections 49 and 50 of the act of 

 March 4, 1909, (35 Stat. 1098) and section 6 of the act of 

 June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 857) in the clauses of these acts 

 which prohibited a destruction of trees. The word "know- 

 ingly" was also used in the act of June 4, 1906 (34 Stat. 208) 

 and section 51 of the act of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1098) in 

 defining the liability of one who should encourage or aid in 

 the boxing of trees or the disposition of the product of such 

 unlawful boxing. 



It is because 1 of the omission of qualifying words requiring 

 a specific intent to violate the statute that the Federal law 

 appears not to have been enforced as strictly as state 

 statutes. No intent to violate the statutes need be shown 

 in a prosecution for the cutting of timber under those clauses 

 of the statutes which make no mention of intent; 1 but the 

 provisions in the statutes regarding the cutting or removing 

 of timber for exportation or disposal have been limited by 

 words requiring a specific intent. Where the prosecution 

 is for an act involving an intent to export or otherwise dis- 



1. U. S. v. Reder, 09 Fed. 905; U. S. v. Murphy, :5l> Fed. :570. 



But soo U. S. v. Oartou 125 Fed. Cas. No. 14, 919, McLean 40 (where there was 

 an honest mistake as to the land). 



