TIMBER STANDING WHEN CONTRACT EXPIRES 149 



land owner shows 1 no intention to use the land l the courts 

 will interpret the contract more liberally as to a reasonable 

 time than they will if the leaving of the timber upon land 

 interferes with the use of it, especially where the owner of the 

 land gives proper notice to the purchaser of the timber that 

 he desires an early removal. 2 In a Pennsylvania case in 

 which the time for removal was not fixed, the purchaser 

 entered within a reasonable time, cut all timber considered 

 merchantable and moved away his mill; it was held that he 

 could not enter again and cut timber eleven years subse- 

 quent to the completion of the first operation. 3 But in 

 another case it has been held that cutting need not be con- 

 tinuous to comply with the terms of a contract which con- 

 tained a limitation as to the number of years to be allowed 

 for removal. 4 If no definite time for the removal of the 

 timber is fixed in a written contract by the owner of land 

 the covenant of title to the trees runs with the land. 5 



117. The Effect of the Termination of the Time 

 Limited for Removal. Many legal contests have arisen 

 in cases where a valid contract required that all of the tim- 

 ber covered by the contract be removed within a given time 

 or gave the vendee the right to enter during a specified time 

 for the purpose of taking the timber. The general rule is 

 that such a contract must be construed as one which con- 

 templates the sale of only such timber as is actually cut and 

 removed within the time limited. 6 Such a contract is 



1. Haskell v. Ayres, 35 Mich. 89, (parol extension) ; Grange v. Palmer, 56 Hun (N. Y.) 



481; Cf. Williams v. Flood, 63 Mich. 487; Ferguson v. Arthur' (Mich.) 

 87 N. W. 259. But see Lbr. Co. v. Roots, 49 Ore. 569, 90 Pac. 487 (con- 

 ditional extension; buyer must show compliance with condition. Pur- 

 chaser may insist on contract right to use roads.) 



2. Short v. Messenger 126 Pa. 637, 17 Atl. 881, 24 W. N. C. 244; Boults v. Mitch- 



ell, 15 Pa. St. 371; Minshaw v. Lbr. Corp. 98 8. C. 8, 81 S. E. 1027. See David- 

 son v. Moore, 37 S. W. 260, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 563; Brown v. Lbr. Co. (Va.) 75 S. 

 E. 84. 



3. Patterson v. Graham, 164 Pa. St. 234, 30 Atl. 247. See also, Moore v. Young, 



162 Mich. 237, 127 N. W. 339; Turner v. Bissell, et al, 69 N. Y. Misc. 167, 126 

 N. Y. Suppl. 234; Davis v. Frazier, 150 N. C. 447, 64 S. E. 200. 



4. Hardison v. Dennis Simmons Lumber Co., 136 N. C. 173, 48 S. E. 588. 



5. Hogg v. Frazier, 70 S. W. 291, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 930. But see Emerson v. Shores 



95 Me. 237, 49 Atl 1051, 85 Am. St. Rep. 404. 



6. Ga. See Lbr. Co. v. Harris, 8 Ga. App. 70, 68 S. E. 749 (oral waiver effective.) 

 Ind. See Veneer Etc. Co. v. Homaday (Ind. App.) 96 N. E. 784. 



Iowa. See Baker v. Kenney, 145 la. 638, 124 N. W. 901. 



Ky. Murray v. Boyd, 165 Ky. 625, 177 S. W. 468; Vincent v. Haycroft, 158 Ky. 



845, 166 S. W. 613; Harrell v. Danks, 151 Ky. 71, 151 S. W. 13; Bach v. 



Little, 140 Ky. 396, 131 S. W. 172; Lbr. Etc. Co. v. Cress, 132 Ky. 317 

 (Footnote 6 continued on next page) 



