DESCRIPTION OF TIMBER SOLD 157 



eluded, 1 but a contract may provide otherwise. 2 If the 

 contract states that the timber sold is that which is suitable 

 for a particular purpose, trees unsuitable for that purpose 

 will not be included, 3 and the custom of the locality may 

 be offered in proof as to the suitability of a certain species for 

 the general purposes named in the contract. 4 However, 

 if certain trees are suitable for the purpose named the pur- 

 chaser may cut them even though he does not intend to use 

 them for that particular purpose. 5 When a certain 

 amount of timber, or all the timber, or certain species, or 

 classes of timber, upon a specified tract of land is sold, the 

 description of the timber 6 or of the land 7 need be only 



1. Hardison v. Lbr. Co., 136 N. C. 173, 48 S. E. 588. Of. Lbr. Co. v. Frith, (Ky.) 



118 S. W. 307; Olmstead v. Niles, 7 N. H. 522. But see Whitfleld v. Lbr. Co., 

 152 N. C. 211, 67 S. E. 512 (bark excluded.) 



2. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Davenport, 82 S. W. 177, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 115. 



3. Ala. See Jacobs v. Roach, 161 Ala. 201, 49 So. 576 (Reservation includes only 



existing timber.) 

 Ga. Mills v. Ivey, 3 Ga. App. 557, 60 S. E. 299; Dickey v. Lbr. Co., 127 Ga. 



460, 56 S. E. 481; Pennington v. Avera, 124 Ga. 147, 52 S. E. 324; 



Martin v. Peddy, 120 Ga. 1079, 48 S. E. 420. See Shaw v. Fender, 



138 Ga. 48 (No limitation in deed as to use.) 

 Ky. Lbr. Co. v. Coleman, 116 S. W. 266. Evans v. Dobbs, 112 S. W. 667, 



33 Ky. L. Rep. 1053. (suitable at time of making contract.) 

 N. Y. Turner v. Bissell, 69 Misc. 167, 126 N. Y. Suppl. 234. 

 N. C. Herring v. Hardison, 126 N. C. 75, 35 S. E. 184. 

 S. C. Lbr. Co. v. Alderman, 80 S. C. 106, 61 S. E. 217. 

 Tex. Kelly v. Robb, 58 Tex. 377 

 U. S. Nelson v. Mfg. Co., 186 Fed. 489. 

 Can. Clark v. White, 3 Can. S. Ct. 309 (Good merchantable timber does not 



mean first class timber.) 



4. Gray Lumber Co. v. Gaskin, 122 Ga. 342, 50 S. E. 164; Whitfleld v. Rowland 



Lbr. Co., 152 N. C. 211. See Allen v. Crank, 23 S. E. 772 (Va. 1895) 



5. Gray Lbr. Co. v. Gaskin, 122 Ga. 342, 50 S. E. 164. But see Handcock v. Lbr. 



Co., 127 Ga. 698, 66 S. E. 1021, ("Timber suitable for saw mill purposes" 

 covers only live timber) ; and Mills et. al. v. Ivey 3 Ga. App. 557 sale "for 

 saw mill purposes" does not convey a turpentine right. 

 Herring v. Hardison, 126 N. C. 75, 35 S. E. 184. 



6. Ala. Kennedy Stave Co., v. Steel Co. 137 Ala. 401, 34 So. 372. 



Ga. Clark v. Stowe, 132 Ga. 621, 64 S, E. 786; Perkins v. Wilcox 132 Ga. 166, 



63 S. E. 831. 



Ky. Day v. Ash'er, 141 Ky. 468, 132 S. W. 1035. (Description of timber con- 

 trols erroneous description of land.) Bradford v. Huffman, 88 S. W. 



1057, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 18, Hayes v. McLin 115, Ky. 39, 72 S. W. 339. 



(All merchantable.) 



La. Lbr. Co. v. Hotard, 122 La. 850, 48 So. 286. 

 Mich. Haskell v. Ayers, 35 Mich. 89 (All merchantable) 

 N. C. Pitts v. Curtis 152 N. C. 615, 68 S. E. 189. Cf. Medlin v. Nav. Co., 145 



N. C. 218,, 58 S. E. 1075. 

 Tenn. Dorris v. King, (ch. App. 1899.) 54 S. W. 683. (All merchantable) N. Y. 



etc. Iron Co. v. Greene County Iron Co. 11 Heisk, 434. 

 W.Va. Darnell v. Wilmoth (1911) 72 S. E. 1023. (Particular words in granting 



clause as to species will not be enlarged by subsequent general words 

 to include other species.) 

 U. S. cf. Lbr. Co. v. Hodge, 218 Fed. 778. (Estimates by arbitrators.) 



7. Ga. Powell v. Lawson, 12 Ga. App. 350, 77 S. E. 183. 



(Footnote 7 continued on next page) 



