PEEFACE xiii 



from the position of the biologist. Indeed, I think 

 that the question of dualism belongs properly to the 

 biologist ; for it is in the fundamental facts of life 

 that all the evidence is to be found. 



I am quite aware that the subject is an ambitious 

 one, and that many people may think that it ought 

 either to be treated more fully or not at all. But 

 if our ideas on the subject are to crystallise into 

 definite shape, it is necessary that a general survey 

 of the position should occasionally be made. I do 

 not claim to speak with authority, nor do I wish to 

 pose as a philosopher. But I give a simple 

 statement of the conclusions to which I have been 

 led, and leave the reader to form his own opinion 

 on their value. 



There is one point in nomenclature that must be 

 mentioned, to prevent misunderstanding. Physio- 

 logists have long recognised that there are two kinds 

 of life, tissue life and bodily or somatic life. And 

 if mind is identical with life, as I suppose, then 

 there must also be a tissue-mind and a somatic-mind. 

 Physiologists have not found it necessary to give 

 different names to these two kinds of life ; and I 

 think that the term mind is sufficient to cover both 

 somatic-mind and tissue-mind, or cell-mind. But 

 in the course of my argument I try to show that 

 cell-mind is essentially free from law ; and this 

 makes a slight difficulty in nomenclature. For the 

 freedom of the cell-mind, although fundamentally 

 identical with free-will in man, is so widely removed 

 from it in action, that the same term can hardly 

 be applied to both. I have, therefore, used 



