the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And 
therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and 
Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all things 
by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that know- 
ledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, 
which appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which con- 
sidereth the simple forms or differences of things, which 
are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations 
whereof make all this variety. The second respect, which 
valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic, is that 
- it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest 
liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physic 
carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to 
many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary 
flexuous courses of nature. But /a/e undique sunt sapienti- 
bus vie: to sapience (which was anciently defined to be 
rerum divinarum et humanarum sctentia) there is ever 
choice of means. For physical causes give light to new 
invention in s¢mili materia. But whosoever knoweth any 
form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that 
nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less re- 
strained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, 
or the condition of the efficient ; which kind of knowledge 
Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sense, elegantly 
describeth ; on arctabuntur gressus tut, ef currens non 
habebis offendiculum. The ways of sapience are not much 
liable either to particularity or chance. 
7. The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of 
final causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted 
but as misplaced. And yet if it were but a fault in order, 
I would not speak of it: for order is matter of illustration, 
but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this 
misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great 
. 
118 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VIL 6. 
—— a 
ea 
, 
ee a 
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