126 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, [VII 5. 
__g. But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy 
according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing con- 
cerning the matter or subject: and that is positive and 
considerative; when the inquiry reporteth either an asser- 
tion or a doubt: These doubts or won liquets are of two 
sorts, particular and total. For the first, we see a good 
example thereof in Aristotle’s Problems, which deserved 
to have had a better continuance; but so nevertheless 
as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and 
taken. The registering of doubts hath two excellent 
uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and 
falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not 
collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, 
but reserved in doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts 
are as so many suckers or sponges to draw use of know- 
ledze; insomuch as that which, if doubts had not pre- 
ceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it 
over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of 
doubts is made to be attended and applied. But both 
these commodities do scarcely countervail an inconveni- 
ence, which will intrude itself if it be not debarred ; which 
is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour rather 
how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it; and 
accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar 
example in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have 
once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for 
a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be 
allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, 
and not those which labour to make certain things doubt- 
ful. Therefore these kalendars of doubts I commend 
as excellent things; so that there be this caution used, 
that when they be throughly sifted and brought to resolu- 
tion, they be from thenceforth omitted, decarded, and not 
es eS 
co 
Ys 
oe. 
ros 
OO ge Pm 
