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1xX.3.] -~—s THE, SECOND BQOK. — 133 
‘airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the 
inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, 
as Socrates said, a Delian diver, being difficult and pro- 
found. But unto all this knowledge de communi vinculo, 
of the concordances between the mind and the body, 
that part of inquiry is most necessary, which considereth 
of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of 
the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; 
which knowledge hath been attempted, and is contro- 
verted, and deserveth to be much better inquired. For 
the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding in 
the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, 
having a greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and 
concupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to 
be despised; but much less to be allowed. So then we 
have constituted (as in our own wish and advice) the 
inquiry touching human nature entire, as a just portion 
' of knowledge to be handled apart. 
X. 1. The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is 
divided as the good of man’s body is divided, unto which 
it referreth. The good of man’s body is of four kinds, 
health, beauty, strength and pleasure: so the knowledges 
are medicine, or art of cure: art of decoration, which is 
called cosmetic; art of activity, which is called athletic ; 
and art voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth eruditus 
luxus. This subject of man’s body is of all other things 
in nature most susceptible of remedy; but then that 
remedy is most susceptible of error. For the same sub- 
tility of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy 
failing; and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more 
exact. 
2. To speak therefore of medicine, and to resume 
that we have said, ascending a little higher: the ancient 
