ra on 
148 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XI.1. 
wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like 
nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance 
of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from 
the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any 
science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagin- 
ation, I see no cause to alter the former division. For 
as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination, 
than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we 
speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagin- 
ation produceth, but of such sciences as handle and con- 
sider of the imagination. No more than we shall speak 
now of such knowledges as reason produceth (for that 
extendeth to all philosophy), but of such knowledges as 
do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as 
poesy had his true place. As for the power of the 
imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the 
same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, 
whereunto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imagin- 
ative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, 
we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. So there- 
fore we content ourselves with the former division, that 
human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the 
mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral. 
2. The part of human philosophy which is rational, is 
of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, 
and seemeth but a net of subtility and spinosity. For as 
it was truly said, that knowledge is pabulum anim? ; so in 
the nature of men’s appetite to this food, most men are 
of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, 
that would fain have returned ad ollas carnium, and were 
weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet 
seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men 
taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, 
