152 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [Xu 2. 
we were, even amongst the Egyptians’ gods; there being 
little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty 
of art, for matter of invention. 
3. Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak 
of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the 
principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, 
and so the middle propositions by derivation from the 
principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly 
vicious and incompetent: wherein their error is the 
fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt 
nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and 
traduced nature. For he that shall attentively observe 
how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of know- 
ledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aére7 
mellis celestia dona, distilling and contriving it out of 
particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the 
field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by 
nature doth manage and act an induction much better 
than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumer- 
ation of particulars, without instance contradictory, is 
no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure 
(in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear 
of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side 
which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested 
upon those sons of Issay which were brought before 
him, and failed of David which was in the field. And 
this form (to say truth) is so gross, as it had not been 
possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things 
to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to 
their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and 
scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to 
use but as Zcfores and vzatores, for sergeants and whifflers, 
ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make room for 
