ae ee 
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XII. 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 155 
6. The invention of speech or argument is not properly 
an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know 
not, and not to recover or resummon that which we 
already know: and the use of this invention is no other 
but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already 
possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may 
be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our con- 
sideration.. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a 
remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which 
is the cause why the schools do place it after judgement, \/ 
as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because 
we do account it a chase as well of deer in an inclosed 
park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already 
obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it 
be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of 
this invention is readiness and present use of our know- 
ledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. 
4. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are 
two courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of 
these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting 
rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And 
herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the 
Sophists near his time, saying, Zhey did as tf one that 
professed the art of shoe-making should not leach how to 
make up a shoe, but only exhibit ina readiness a number of 
shoes of all fashions and sizes. But yet a man might reply, 
that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, 
but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly 
customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine know- 
ledge, saith, Zhat the kingdom of heaven is like a good house- 
holder, that bringeth forth both new and old store: and we 
see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, 
that pleaders should have the places, whereof they have 
