a e 
wis 
eee he ee 
woes = 
Mos 
* 
XIll. 9.] THE SECOND BOOK. 157 
knowledge. For as Plato saith, Whosoever seeketh, knoweth 
that which he seeketh for in a general notion: else how shail 
he know it when he hath found it? And therefore the larger 
your anticipation is, the more direct and. compendious is 
your search. But the same places which will help us 
what to produce of that which we know already, will also 
help us, if a man of experience were before us, what ques- 
tions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct 
us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot 
report that this part of invention, which is that which the 
schools call topics, is deficient. 
to. Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and 
special. ‘The general we have spoken to; but the par- 
ticular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally 
as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which 
hath reigned too much in the schools (which is, to be 
vainly subtile in a few things which are within their com- 
mand, and to reject the rest), I do receive particular 
topics, that is, places or directions of invention and 
inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great 
use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences. 
For in these it holdeth, ars znveniendi adolescit cum inventis ; 
for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of 
the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of 
that part of the way which remaineth: so every degree of 
proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which fol- 
loweth; which light if we strengthen by drawing it forth 
into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance 
our pursuit. 
XIV. 1. Now we pass unto the arts of judgement, 
which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations ; 
which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention. 
For in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the 
