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158 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIV.1. 
same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all | 
one as in thé sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syl- 
logism ; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, 
the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judge- 
ment of the consequence is another; the one exciting 
_ only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and 
exact form of judgement, we refer ourselves to that which 
_we have spoken of interpretation of nature. 
2. For the other judgement by syllogism, as it is a 
thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been 
‘vehemently and excellently laboured. For the nature of 
‘man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his under- 
\ standing fixed and unmoveable, and as a rest and support 
of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to 
‘prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent ; 
and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas 
(that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to 
be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon 
the conversion is accomplished: so assuredly men have a 
desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them 
from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of 
falling. ‘Therefore men did hasten to set down some 
principles about which the variety of their disputations 
might turn. 
3. So then this art of judgement is but the reduction of 
propositions to principles in a middle term. The prin- 
ciples to be agreed by all and exempted from argument ; 
the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man’s 
invention ; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and 
inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to 
the principle, which they term a probation ostensive; the 
other, when the contradictory of the proposition is re- 
duced to the contradictory of the principle, which is 
