XIV. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 159 
that which they call per zncommodum, or pressing an ab- 
surdity; the number of middle terms to be as the pro- 
position standeth degrees more or less removed from 
the principle. 
4. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, 
the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution ; 
the former frameth and setteth down a true form of con- 
sequence, by the variations and deflections from which 
errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. To- 
ward the composition and structure of which form, it is 
incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propos- 
itions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple 
words. And this is that part of logic which is compre- 
hended in the Analytics. 
5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for 
expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more 
subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their 
redargutions, which is that which is termed edenches. For 
although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth 
(as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling 
feats, which, though we know not how they are done, 
yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the 
more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides 
his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgement. 
6. This part concerning e/enches is excellently handled 
by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in 
example; not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even 
in Socrates himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, 
but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath 
exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and 
redargution. And although we have said that the use of 
this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the de- 
generate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, 
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