‘ye ae 
XIv.9.] THE SECOND BOOK. » 161 
place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most 
to rectify judgement: the force whereof is such, as it 
doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some par- 
ticulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and 
corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far 
from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the 
beams of things should reflect according to their true 
incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full 
of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and 
reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false ap- 
pearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature 
of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as 
first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, 
namely, that to the nature of the mind of all men it is 
consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than 
the negative or privative. So that a few times hitting or 
presence, countervails oft-times failing or absence; as was 
well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in 
Neptune’s temple the great number of pictures of such as 
had scaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Nep- 
tune, saying, Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate 
Nepiune in tempest. Fea, but (saith Diagoras) where are 
they painted that are drowned? Let us behold it in another 
instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an equal 
and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in 
nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth, 
Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy 
themselves except they reduce the motions of the celestial 
bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labour- 
ing to be discharged of eccentrics, Hence it cometh, that 
whereas there are many things in nature, as it were 
monodica, sui juris; yet the cogitations of man do feign 
unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no 
Pe ; 
