eA 
XIV. 10] ‘THE SECOND BOOK. 163 
peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first 
book. 
11. And lastly, let us consider the false appearances 
that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed 
and applied according to the conceit and capacities of 
the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our 
words, and prescribe it well loguendum ut vulgus senti- 
endum ut sapientes; yet certain it is that words, as a 
Tartar’s bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of 
the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judge- 
ment. So as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and 
disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, 
in setting down in the very beginning the definitions 
of our words and terms, that others may know how 
we accept and understand them, and whether they con- 
cur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want 
of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to 
have begun, which is, in questions and differences about 
words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that 
it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies 
and false appearances, because they are inseparable from 
our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the 
caution of them (for all edenches, as was said, Elenchi 
are but cautions) doth extremely import the  jpavni, sive 
true conduct of human judgement. The de idolis ani- 
particular e/enches or cautions against these i bumani 
three false appearances, I find altogether “vs # 
deficient, adventitiis. 
12. There remaineth one part of judgement of great 
excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly 
touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the 
application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing 
kinds of subjects. For there being but four kinds of 
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